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The War Of The Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 (Cassell Military Paperbacks)

posted Wednesday, 19 January 2005
The War Of The Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 (Cassell Military Paperbacks)

Noel Barber

Date: 19 January, 2005   —   $9.71   —   Book

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Lost in the hubub over the Vietnam saga is the Malayan "Emergency" - the communist insurgency in Malaya from 1948 to 1960. I don't want to give away the ending, but THE BRITISH WON. Hmm... An insurgency, an occupying army, a populace supporting insurgents, and A DECISIVE DEFEAT OF THE INSURGENCY. Sound familiar? Except for the last part, I mean.

Seriously, there was a lot that could have been learned from the British victory and applied in Iraq. James Dobbins recently wrote an article where he actually recommends putting internal security in the hands of British forces in Iraq, because they have experience (and victories) in combating communist and nationalist insurgencies and we don't.

According to Noel Barber, here's the British secret: it "was a war of ideologies" which would be won by "armed support for a political war, not political support for an army war." The British stuck to that formula for the duration, putting police on the front line backed up by military ground and air support.

The fundamental mission the British undertook was to protect the populace and isolate the insurgents. It was (should still be) well understood that an insurgency will wither without support from the people. In order to secure intelligence and supplies, insurgents can sometimes rely on willing support for "the cause", but more often they need to terrorize the populace into assisting them. The British understood that "you can't expect any support from people you can't protect," and adjusted troop levels and procedures accordingly.

Really, this is an excellent book. It's very readable - more like a techno-thriller than a military history. There are stories of espionage, counter-espionage, infiltration, detective work, Shakespeare-reading communists, ambushes, massacres, pitched jungle battles, and even ingenious Americans. Plus, it has a happy ending.

The book is definitely written with the benefit of hindsight, but that makes it no less entertaining and instructive. For example, one of the most effective measures the British took (besides making it VERY clear that they were going to completely pull out when the insurgency ended) was the introduction of national ID cards. Anyone without a card was an insurgent, and this simple act made life very hard on the bad guys.

If US administrators in Iraq haven't learned anything from history, perhaps Iraq's new leaders will. It's also interesting to note that the US commanding officer in Afghanistan is a student of the Malayan Emergency. Any correlation with the relative levels of insurgent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan? Hmm...




1. Ernest Ellwood left...
Friday, 6 April 2007 11:17 am

I agree with all you have said. I was serving in Singapore at the time of the emergency,(1949-52. 52-54)


2. American Pundit left...
Friday, 6 April 2007 9:43 pm :: http://americanpundit.blog-city.com

Thanks, Ernest. You guys did a great job out there. Having lived in Singapore for three years myself, I have a deep respect for what you did.


3. A R Mahmud left...
Sunday, 22 July 2007 6:50 pm

I have read and re-read the book severeal times. The first time I read was the condensed version when I was in junior High. It appeared in the Reader's Digest Book section way back in the early 70's. Noel Barber puts the story in a fast phase mood. It was intriguing. So I bought the book when I was in college. Now I am teacing in a University, and I am still reading it and often relate it to my students on how my country with the help of British psychological and civilian approach (not military) were able to defeat the communist, backed by Mao's Red China.

Americans could have won the Vietnam war if they use the British tactics of "winning the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese. But, no they did not. Tragedies of massacre such as May lai only create resentment from the mases. Same thing is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bakuba, fallujah, etc.). Too bad the American troops still has not learned and are still "trigger happy" killing innocent masses. When will they learn from history. On top of that, the American President himself has not learn anything while in college let alone lerning anything after college. I would strongly suggest President Bush to read Noel Barber's "War of the Running Dog" and learn something out of it. Throw the the CIA's Intelegence report and read Noel Barber's book instead, . . . STUPID!


4. American Pundit left...
Tuesday, 24 July 2007 8:59 am :: http://americanpundit.blog-city.com

Thanks for the note, AR. I think you're right about Vietnam, in fact the British were asked to consult with the US miilitary in Vietnam about their experience in Malaya -- and were ignored.

And yes, the same mistakes are being made in Iraq and (to a lesser extent) in Afghanistan. Both those situations are fundamentally police actions and the military should be subordinate to the civil government. Those countries need police and engineers now, not combat troops.

By the way, are you from Malaysia? I visited several times from Singapore. It's a beautiful and friendly country. Thanks!


5. george crooks left...
Tuesday, 16 September 2008 2:54 pm :: http://www.crooks-family.co.uk

I served in Malaya from 1959 to 1960 and there were American Officers learning British tactics. They were great guys I thought they had guts and often wonder why they did not put into practice what they were taught .British soldiers have the greatest respect for the yank foot soldiers,its their leaders who need to listen to the troops.good luck in Iraq


6. David Ryves left...
Saturday, 28 February 2009 3:42 pm

OK in the interests of historical accuracy i'd like to post this comment by my Father, H.T.B.Ryves CBE JMN who was Deputy Commissioner and Director of Special Branch (1954-1960), Royal Federation of Malaya Police on this lamentable book - I owe it to his memory ...

"The War of the Running Dogs by Noel Barber

For those in the know this is both a bad and extremely irritating book because it is too fictionalised. Noel Barber did not set out write a purely factual history because he had already sold his soul to the Devil in the form of Reader’s Digest for serialisation rights. That organisation with an eye on the American market (see the reference equating the size of Malaya to Florida) wanted a good ‘racy’ story with a ‘hero’.

Barber came up with Bob Thompson – who was never exactly slow in pushing himself forward – as the ‘hero’. Needless to say the exposure given to Thompson in this book is quite preposterous and gives a wildly unbalanced picture of the true situation.

For example, I know that Thompson never went anywhere near Sengai Siput after the murders of the British planters and which heralded the outbreak of the Emergency. After all, I should know as I was in command of the Special Branch in Ipoh at that time and these murders, like any others, were a matter for the police and completely outside Thompson’s duties as Chinese Affairs Officer.

As for the suggestion in the Postscript that he is a World authority on Communism (this) is sheer rubbish. In fact I was offered the job on the British Advisory Mission in Vietnam but declined it, but then Desmond Palmer joined it as the real expert on Communism and counter-insurgency.

Harry Miller told me that Templer was so incensed over this book that he ‘phoned up Barber and in his typically blunt manner asked “Who the bloody hell is this bugger Thompson whom you eulogise in your book?”

It is significant that in the two really excellent books written by Harry Miller – ‘Menace in Malaya’ and ‘Jungle War in Malaya’ – Thompson is not mentioned in either of them.

Likewise the statement that David Storrier was chosen to track down Osman China is rubbish. Storrier, a good but junior Officer, was the S.B. officer for Kuala Lipis police district and as Osman operated in that district he was Storrier’s No 1 target. The whole account of this affair contains too much fiction and over dramatisation just as is the case of Evan Davis and Goh Peng Tuan.

Davis, like Thomson, was no shrinking violet and always played to the gallery with an eye to the main chance for maximum publicity, but to give him his due he had plenty of ability.

The best books on the Malayan Emergency are the two written by Harry Miller – factual and accurate.

Harvey Ryves"