The War Of The Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 (Cassell Military Paperbacks)

The War Of The Running Dogs: Malaya 1948-1960 (Cassell Military Paperbacks) Noel Barber Date: 19 January, 2005   —   $9.71   —   Book product page Rating:

Lost in the hubub over the Vietnam saga is the Malayan "Emergency" - the communist insurgency in Malaya from 1948 to 1960. I don't want to give away the ending, but THE BRITISH WON. Hmm... An insurgency, an occupying army, a populace supporting insurgents, and A DECISIVE DEFEAT OF THE INSURGENCY. Sound familiar? Except for the last part, I mean.

Seriously, there was a lot that could have been learned from the British victory and applied in Iraq. James Dobbins recently wrote an article where he actually recommends putting internal security in the hands of British forces in Iraq, because they have experience (and victories) in combating communist and nationalist insurgencies and we don't.

According to Noel Barber, here's the British secret: it "was a war of ideologies" which would be won by "armed support for a political war, not political support for an army war." The British stuck to that formula for the duration, putting police on the front line backed up by military ground and air support.

The fundamental mission the British undertook was to protect the populace and isolate the insurgents. It was (should still be) well understood that an insurgency will wither without support from the people. In order to secure intelligence and supplies, insurgents can sometimes rely on willing support for "the cause", but more often they need to terrorize the populace into assisting them. The British understood that "you can't expect any support from people you can't protect," and adjusted troop levels and procedures accordingly.

Really, this is an excellent book. It's very readable - more like a techno-thriller than a military history. There are stories of espionage, counter-espionage, infiltration, detective work, Shakespeare-reading communists, ambushes, massacres, pitched jungle battles, and even ingenious Americans. Plus, it has a happy ending.

The book is definitely written with the benefit of hindsight, but that makes it no less entertaining and instructive. For example, one of the most effective measures the British took (besides making it VERY clear that they were going to completely pull out when the insurgency ended) was the introduction of national ID cards. Anyone without a card was an insurgent, and this simple act made life very hard on the bad guys.

If US administrators in Iraq haven't learned anything from history, perhaps Iraq's new leaders will. It's also interesting to note that the US commanding officer in Afghanistan is a student of the Malayan Emergency. Any correlation with the relative levels of insurgent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan? Hmm...