Plan of Attack

Plan of Attack Bob Woodward Date: 19 April, 2004   —   $16.80   —   Book product page Rating:

I read this book when it first came out. I can't believe I haven't reviewed it yet! Well, here it is: The most amazing thing about this book, and about Woodward's previous book, "Bush at War", is the even-handedness of it. If you're center to left, you'll be disturbed by Bush, his cabinet, and the way this country was brought to war. If you're a rightie, you're going to come out of this book admiring a great man who dealt swiftly and decisively with a great threat. I don't know how Woodward does it, but he's good at it.

The book, based on hours of interviews with Bush and his crew, is the tale of how our troops ended up in Fort Apache: Baghdad. It presents the events and planning leading up to the war in a non-judgmental manner, and in fact seems slightly biased to President Bush's cause, since the majority of the source material is based on interviews with him. Bush, through Woodward, presents his case for the invasion of Iraq and details why certain decisions were made at certain times. Woodward leaves it up to the reader to decide whether those decisions were well thought out.

There was a little controversy when the book came out, mostly over when the actual decision for war was made. The administration's official line is that the decision was put off until the last possible moment. The fact is, the decision had been made long before March, 2003. The only thing that could have stopped the invasion is a scenario in which Saddam Hussein quickly cobbles together some WMDs, and then turns them over to inspectors. So "technically" no decision was made, but it was a foregone conclusion from the start. That theory of "technicalities" will probably define Bush's presidency. "Technically", Bush never said Iraq was an imminent threat. "Technically", Bush never said Saddam was in cahoots with al Qaeda. The book, predictably, only hints that these semantic games were a calculated part of Bush's strategy for garnering support for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The most heartbreaking thread in the book focuses on how Powell let himself be used to legitimize the invasion. Powell says he did all he could to dissuade the President, but that's obviously not true, and it's sad that Powell thinks that it is. If Powell truly believed the hawks were going about regime change in Iraq the wrong way, he could have threatened to resign, rather than just giving the president ambiguous signals; he could have refused to present evidence to the world that he worried was suspect, rather than carefully seeding his statements with subtle caveats; he could have done any number of things, rather than pursue a strategy of mild passive resistance. But when it came down to it, Powell clicked his heels, saluted, and served his commander like a good soldier, rather than acting like a policy maker.

It's a good read, but there aren't any smoking guns. And I don't think it's going to change any minds, because Woodward's "just the facts" presentation ensures you'll get out of it what you bring with you.