Disarming Iraq

Disarming Iraq Hans Blix Date: 09 March, 2004   —   $16.80   —   Book product page Rating:

There's been a lot of disinformation put out by the Bush administration about the role of the UN inspectors in Iraq both before, and after the invasion. If you want the story from the horse's mouth, this is it.

I don't want to give away the ending, but the bottom line is, "Had there been any denials of access? Any cat and mouse games? No. Had the inspections been going well? Yes." Blix contends, "...but if there had not been hopeful results by, say, July 2003, when the 120 day [inspection] period would have expired, it seems likely that a majority in the [UN] Security Council might have been ready to authorize armed action, which could have started with UN legitimacy after the summer heat -- and revealed that there were no weapons."

"Disarming Iraq" is an interesting behind the scenes look at how the inspections played out from the point of view of the guy in charge. It also points out, though unintentionally in some cases, the misunderstandings caused by ideological and cultural differences.

For example, Vice President Cheney " stated the position that inspections, if they do not give results, cannot go on forever, and said the U.S. was 'ready to discredit inspections in favor of disarmament.'" Blix seems to have taken that as a metaphor, rather than thinking Cheney would actually try to discredit inspections, the inspectors, or himself.

Another example is the way the Iraqis dealt with the inspection process. Every time Blix would try to get the Iraqis to do something, they used it as an excuse to haggle. It exasperated Blix (and the Bush administration), but I suspect it was more of an Arab cultural thing than actual attempts at obstruction; the Iraqis always gave in quickly when Blix refused to barter.

The book also has some light moments such as when, after being asked if it might be difficult for the Iraqis to quickly compile a weapons declaration, Blix responded that, "producing mustard gas is not like producing marmalade. You keep track of how much you make and what happens to it." [Another cultural misunderstanding, perhaps - AP] Soon after, at the first presidential palace to be searched, inspectors found no WMDs, but they did find several refrigerators copiously stocked with marmalade.

Blix also covers some nuances of the UN negotiations. He clears up the role of UNMOVIC: his role was solely to inspect and report. He had no authority to declare that Iraq was in compliance with Security Council resolutions or not. That was up to the Security Council. Or was it? Blix points out that President Bush felt the US and UK could make that judgment on their own and still claim to speak for the Security Council. You still hear Bush make the claim that he was enforcing Security Council resolution 1441, even though the Security Council never gave him the authority to do so. Blix also explains the procedural matters which made France, Russia, and China's veto of a second resolution authoring force a foregone conclusion.

And then there's the dirt. Blix addresses all the accusations and smears that the Bush administration threw at him, UNMOVIC, and the IAEA. It makes for sordid, but fun reading.

In the end, the IAEA reported that Iraq had no nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon programs; UNMOVIC never found any evidence that Iraq still had WMDs; the Iraqis were working with UNMOVIC to figure out a way to verify, ten years after the fact, the secret destruction of their WMD and WMD programs; the Iraqis were proactively helping destroy scores of prohibited missiles; and none of it mattered at all to the Bush administration. Their minds were already made up.