Allies At War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq

Allies At War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq Philip H. Gordon & Jeremy Shapiro Date: 01 April, 2004   —   $13.97   —   Book product page Rating:

Gordon and Shapiro have written what is currently the definitive critique of the failure of diplomacy that led to the United States' unilateral invasion of Iraq. Before the war, polls showed that two thirds of Americans felt we should not invade without UN support. Most of us have only a vague idea of why President Bush decided to ignore the will of the citizens whom he serves. If you're interested in the full account - from both sides of the Atlantic - of what led to Bush's split with the UN, this is the book.

The authors deal exclusively with the US/European "Atlantic Alliance", and explore the failure of the alliance to act in concert on Iraq. They make the claim that this crisis need not have been any worse than previous policy disagreements between alliance members, had any number of seemingly innocuous events and personalities been different. As it was, the crisis was brought about by a perfect storm of miscalculation, clashing personalities, political situations, and cultures. But, make no mistake; it was fundamentally a failure of the leaders of the Atlantic Alliance that left the United States holding the bag in Iraq.

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, in danger of losing re-election, irresponsibly chose to campaign on the wave of German public reaction against what Europe saw as Bush's dangerous cowboy diplomacy. Had the Bush administration chosen to delay stepping up its campaign to rally domestic support for war, that tactic wouldn't have helped Schroeder. When asked if Cheney had considered German public reaction and Schroeder's re-election problems when he made his tough Iraq speech in August 2002, a close aide replied, "Why should he care about the reaction in Germany?" Once elected, Schroeder tried to mend fences, but at that point the personal relationship between he and Bush had turned sour, and further diplomatic discussions ceased. It's interesting to note though, that through bilateral agreements rather than through the alliance, Germany supplied more troops to the region than most members of the ad-hoc coalition that invaded Iraq.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, bowing to public opinion in his country and in his political party, insisted on going back to the UN for a second Security Council resolution, even though Bush felt they had all the legitimacy they needed from the first resolution. French President Jacques Chirac, knowing that his rhetoric had put him in a position where he would have to veto any new resolution, begged Bush and Blair not to push for it. Had that not happened, much of the acrimonious rhetoric and deterioration of relationships throughout February and March 2002 could have been avoided

Chirac, flirting with Gaullist visions of a European counterweight to US power, fought for the principle of UN Security Council (with a French veto) control over the decision to go to war. When France voted for the first Iraq resolution, Chirac fully expected Iraq to force the alliance into war. In fact, as late as January 2003, French military leaders were meeting with their US counterparts about integrating French forces into the invasion. But about that time, Chirac's rhetoric and fight for "principles" had turned off any Pentagon desire for French participation. Douglas Feith told a French defense minister, "We don't want you involved! You think you can be Saddam's lawyer for two months without some consequences!" Instead of welcoming even token French help with the invasion, the French were asked to send fighter planes to Iceland to free up US planes for action in Iraq.

When Saddam decided to cooperate - though not quite fully - he exploited a rift that no one had noticed. It's doubtful this was done on purpose, but it created a situation where, in the absence of hard benchmarks, some European countries could claim that Iraq was cooperating fully, and others, along with the United States, could claim he was not in full compliance. Had the requirements been better defined, it would have been obvious whether Saddam was complying, and the split could have been avoided.

And then there was President George W. Bush and his administration. The sheer arrogance with which the administration approached the alliance on the Iraq issue practically assured that cooperation would be difficult. Bush's insistence on making the case for invasion "clearer than the truth", guaranteed that Europeans would look for an ulterior motive, and be generally unsupportive despite recognizing that Iraq really was a problem. Throw in the Bush administration's complete disregard for the Kyoto Treaty (Europeans uniformly believe global warming is the biggest long-term threat), the constant "you're with us, or with the terrorists" rhetoric, and the obvious treating of the alliance as a rubber stamp for US action, and the stage was set for a complete collapse of trans-Atlantic cooperation.

The authors conclude the book with a chapter on how to save the alliance which has served this country well for over fifty years. Interestingly, I've seen similar solutions offered by both John Kerry and Republican Senator Chuck Hagel. Since the Republicans caused the collapse, I'm guessing that, despite Hagel's internationalist rhetoric, the Republicans aren't the ones to put it back together.

I could go on and on about this book. There are quite a few "I didn't realize that!" moments that kept me turning pages. So if you want the whole story of the worst US/European alliance crisis in history, in one easy 221 page read, this is the book.